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Humans are arguably unique in the extent and scale of cooperation with unre-
lated individuals. While pairwise interactions among non-relatives occur in
some non-human species, there is scant evidence of the large-scale, often
unconditional prosociality that characterizes human social behaviour. Conse-
quently, one may ask whether research on cooperation in humans can offer
general insights to researchers working on similar questions in non-human
species, and whether research on humans should be published in biology
journals. We contend that the answer to both of these questions is yes. Most
importantly, social behaviour in humans and other species operates under
the same evolutionary framework. Moreover, we highlight how an open dia-
logue between different fields can inspire studies on humans and non-human
species, leading to novel approaches and insights. Biology journals should
encourage these discussions rather than drawing artificial boundaries between
disciplines. Shared current and future challenges are to study helping in eco-
logically relevant contexts in order to correctly interpret how payoff
matrices translate into inclusive fitness, and to integrate mechanisms into
the hitherto largely functional theory. We can and should study human
cooperation within a comparative framework in order to gain a full under-
standing of the evolution of helping.1. Introduction
Helping behaviours that increase the direct fitness of recipients underpin several
major evolutionary transitions [1]. Acts in which helpers provide any resource
(e.g. food, time) are interesting because evolutionary theory strongly emphasizes
the importance of competition and selfish behaviour. Humans are adept at help-
ing each other. From a quantitative perspective, this trait is not unique in the
animal kingdom; arguably, hymenopterans and other eusocial species are even
more helpful within their colonies. However, helping by the latter is explained
by biological altruism based on kin selection [2,3], while humans also cooperate
with unrelated individuals for direct fitness benefits on a scale that is unmatched
by any other species. Importantly, the criteria for cooperating are highly flexible:
the same individual may cooperate with friends, colleagues, supporters of the
same football club, political affiliates, compatriots or even international alliances.
Help can be provided in different currencies (e.g. time/money/physical effort)
and is also often provided in situations where it is unclear how return benefits
may be accrued, from letting a car out at a busy junction to donating to victims
of natural disasters in far-away countries.
The frequency and scale of human helping could depend on several factors
that appear to be unique to humans: our capacity for spoken and written
language, the use of tags to identify groups, societal-level norms and insti-
tutions that both prescribe cooperation and punish defection, various media
channels that allow for large-scale communication and coordination, and
banks to transfer money—a unique non-perishable resource—anywhere. One
might therefore wonder to what extent research on human cooperation yields
idiosyncratic explanations, rendering comparisons with other species useless.
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suitable for publication in biological journals like Proceedings
of the Royal Society B. Here, we address this question. We first
summarize briefly the enormous impact that theoretical con-
cepts and empirical studies of human cooperation have had
on research in other species. We then highlight topics of inter-
disciplinary interest and shared future challenges. It should
become clear that we favour an open-minded and inclusive
approach, where humans are just another species that can
be studied under the general framework of evolutionary
theory. While human cooperation might be more peculiar
than cooperation in many non-human species, each species
would appear unique if every detail was taken into consider-
ation. Therefore, a distinction between disciplines based on
study organisms only hinders progress.B
284:201709292. Theory on human helping as inspiration for
biological research
Theoretical approaches to understand helping in humans pre-
date evolutionary concepts of helping. The principal tools
used by biologists were developed by economists in the
form of game theory—a framework to understand how
humans should make decisions in strategic interactions [4].
A ‘game’ is a formal mathematical model of an interaction,
defining the payoffs to all players. A key insight is that
players’ payoffs are affected by their own decisions and
also by those of their partner(s). Thus, the dominant strategy
depends on the strategy that is used by the partner(s). Econ-
omists assume that payoffs translate into utility and that
players maximize utility. Stylized economic games were
developed to study optimal decision rules. In their simplest
form, these games consist of two players who can each
choose between two actions, for example to cooperate or to
defect. Games can be one-shot or repeated over a number
of rounds. The resulting payoffs of action combinations can
be captured by a 2  2 matrix. The matrices for well-known
games [5], like the prisoner’s dilemma game, the prisoner’s
delight game and the snowdrift game (also called hawk–
dove game) are summarized in figure 1. These games were
subsequently adopted by evolutionary biologists to explore
when helping behaviour could be evolutionarily stable [6]
in a population. Under this evolutionary approach, strategies
are inherited traits that specify behaviours [7]. Rather than
utility, evolutionary biologists assume that payoffs translate
into fitness, with the accompanying assumption that strat-
egies which, on average, increase fitness will be under
positive selection.
A common goal is to understand why individuals should
provide help to others. Economists, never considering the
genetic structure of human populations, focused on how
helping may increase on average the direct fitness of that
actor. This form of helping has been termed ‘mutual benefits’
[8] or ‘cooperation’ [9]. We will use the latter term in this
paper, and restrict the term ‘mutualism’ to describe mutual
helping between species [10]. Economists demonstrated that
cooperative solutions are possible, when the number of
rounds times the benefits of mutual cooperation outweigh the
cost of cooperating (folk theorem [5,11]). Evolutionary theorists
subsequently rediscovered this principle verbally [12] and then
mathematically, albeit with limited generality [13]. Economists
also showed how supply and demand determine exchangerates [14], an insight that was then incorporated into biological
market theory [15,16]. Similarly, the idea that reputational
effects in a communication network may affect animal behav-
iour [17] was foreshadowed by concepts explicitly developed
by economists to understand human cooperation [18,19].
Evolutionary biology provided a major conceptual insight
thanks to Hamilton’s kin selection theory [2,3]. Helping may
be altruistic in biological terms, by reducing the actor’s life-
time reproductive success, and yet still be positively
selected if helper and recipient are related (specifically,
when rB 2 C. 0, where r ¼ relatedness between actor and
beneficiary, B ¼ fitness benefit conferred on beneficiary and
C ¼ personal fitness cost incurred by actor [2,3]). Thus, the
one-sided borrowing from biologists eventually became a
fruitful dialogue, not least because cooperation and biological
altruism may act simultaneously to promote selection on
helping, including in humans (e.g. [20–22]). Indeed, game-
theoretic approaches have become increasingly prominent
in the attempt to understand the evolution of helping
behaviour [7,23]. Importantly, the logic underpinning
game-theoretical models of behaviour reflects general prin-
ciples in evolutionary theory and may hence be applied to
any species, including humans.3. Empirical research on human helping as
inspiration for animal research
We focus on supposed examples of cooperation based on
investments. We define an investment as a behaviour that
reduces the current payoff of the actor and increases the cur-
rent payoff of the recipient. Cooperation based on investment
appears to be vulnerable to cheaters who do not invest but
receive investment from others. A vast theoretical literature
has shown that higher-level selection processes (kin/group
selection, interdependencies between individuals) may
select against cheating. These processes have been relatively
neglected in empirical studies, partly because of the difficulty
of quantifying them. More ecologically motivated future
research may hence reveal that some apparent investments
are actually self-serving forms of helping [24]. As with theor-
etical concepts, empirical research on human helping has had
a serious head start over similar research on non-human ani-
mals. It is impossible to summarize the existing literature on
human helping adequately here. Though most of this
research focuses on understanding human social behaviour
only, the data and conclusions nevertheless provide inspi-
ration to researchers studying non-human animals, who
might look for similar behaviours in their own study systems.
In this context, it is important to distinguish ultimate from
proximate questions [25]. Ultimate questions address the
adaptive value of helping, which is rather simple: helpful
strategies can only be under positive selection if they provide
lifetime fitness benefits (þ/þ) to all participants, the excep-
tion being biological altruism (2/þ) based on kin selection.
Thus, from an ultimate perspective, there is no a priori
reason to demarcate research aimed at understanding the
evolution of costly social behaviour in humans from similar
research on other species. In contrast, the proximate mechan-
isms underlying social decision-making can be highly
diverse: genetic predispositions, physiological states and cog-
nitive mechanisms may all interact to produce social
behaviour, and humans might often use idiosyncratic
prisoner’s dilemma prisoner’s delight snowdrift
player 2 player 2
help
player 1
no help
player 2
help no help help no help help no help
3 3 1 4
4 1 2 2
4 4 2 3
3 2 1 1
3        3 2 4
4 2 1 1
Figure 1. Three stylized economic games that differ with respect to the payoff matrix. In the prisoner’s dilemma, not helping yields a higher payoff in each
interaction no matter how the partner behaves, which makes helping an investment that needs to yield future benefits. Thus, iterated interactions are required
for conditional helping to evolve. In the prisoner’s delight, helping yields a higher payoff no matter how the partner behaves, which makes helping a self-serving
action, even in a single-round game. In the snowdrift game, the best choice depends on the partner’s action: help if the partner does not help and do not help if
the partner helps. Under these circumstances helping is under negative frequency-dependent selection in a single-round game.
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these include mentalizing, fairness preferences, cultural
norms, shared intentionality, and the ability to communicate
intentions using gestures (such as pointing) and language.
These abilities may not be unique to humans, but they are
unarguably more pronounced in humans than in any other
species. Moreover, variation in proximate mechanisms can
affect the means by which cooperation is achieved—and
sometimes even the possibility to achieve it [26]. We therefore
discuss research on ultimate and proximate explanations for
costly social strategies separately.(a) Ultimate explanations
Humans appear to be an excellent model species to test the
predictions of evolutionary game theory. Experimenters can
construct precise material payoffs for any possible combi-
nation of individual decisions, decide how many rounds
are played with whom, and how much information subjects
obtain. To understand the adaptive significance of costly
helping behaviour, many studies on humans have identified
partner control mechanisms—responses to being cheated that
reduce the cheater’s payoff [27]. These include tit-for-tat-like
reciprocity, punishment, reputation effects, partner choice
and (relatedly) ostracism (e.g. [28–31]).
After an initial focus on tit-for-tat-like reciprocity
(reviewed in [32]), biologists also searched for examples of
these same partner control mechanisms in non-human
species. Marine cleaning mutualism involving the cleaner
wrasse Labroides dimidiatus provided experimental support
for all these control mechanisms. Cleaners remove ectopara-
sites from visiting ‘client’ reef fishes [33]. Nevertheless,
conflict arises because cleaners prefer to eat client mucus,
which constitutes cheating. Therefore, clients have to make
cleaners feed against their preference to receive a good ser-
vice [34]. Partner control mechanisms become visible when
clients respond to cleaners taking a bite of mucus (which cor-
relates with clients visibly jolting in response to cleaner
mouth contact). As summarized in [34], client species with
access to a single cleaning station punish cleaners through
aggressive chases, while clients with access to several clean-
ing stations terminate the interaction and visit another
cleaner for their next inspection. In addition, clients arriving
at a cleaning station extract information from any ongoing
interaction and invite for inspection only if the cleaner
behaves cooperatively. Thus, the cleaner’s reputation
depends on their behaviour, and they behave more coopera-
tively if they are observed. Finally, the larger cleaner malesmay also punish their female partner for cheating a jointly
inspected client, a simple form of third party punishment
[35] that is fine-tuned to the stakes (i.e. the quality of the
client as a food source) [36].
Research on cleaning mutualism was partly inspired by
classic studies on the effects of punishment and reputation
on human cooperation, which highlighted that the possibility
of being punished or being chosen for interactions by obser-
vers, respectively, could both promote cooperation at higher
levels than when these incentives were absent (e.g. [28,30]).
Meanwhile, results from the cleaner fish mutualism have, in
turn, inspired subsequent studies on partner choice and asym-
metric punishment in humans, for example leading us to
investigate whether punishment or partner choice is a more
effective incentive to cooperate when both incentives are co-
present [37], and to explore whether power asymmetries
increase the efficacy of punishment as a cooperation-enforcing
mechanism in two-player games [38].
Unlike most non-human species, humans regularly
cooperate in large groups of unrelated individuals. Economists
and social scientists have therefore pioneered the study of
cooperation in groups. The payoffs can be captured using
public goods games, where benefits are assumed to be either
a linear or a sigmoid function of investments (figure 2).
Under the former assumption, the interaction is an n-player
prisoner’s dilemma and investments therefore risk being bio-
logically altruistic. Where benefits are a nonlinear function of
investments, then the interaction is an n-player snowdrift
game (a volunteer’s dilemma) and contributions are nega-
tively frequency dependent (figure 2) [39,40]. Again, claims
about human uniqueness with respect to n-player cooperation
have inspired biologists interested in a comparative approach
to find suitable non-human model systems in which to apply
the human literature on public goods games. Importantly, the
most suitable species will not necessarily be the species that
are phylogenetically most related to humans, but those that
routinely interact in n-player social dilemmas (with non-rela-
tives)—such that n-player social dilemmas constitute an
ecologically valid scenario. To this end, species that regularly
engage in inter-group conflict may provide a promising arena.
Humans promote cooperation in larger groups by providing
incentives: rewarding contributors to the public good and
punishing so-called free-riders [28,41]. Similarly, female
vervet monkeys use these same incentives to increase male
participation in inter-group conflicts [42].
One of the key difficulties in identifying n-player public
goods games outside of humans is to obtain informed esti-
mates of both the precise payoff matrices and the fitness
n-player prisoner’s dilemma
contribute
focal player 
defect
n-player snowdrift (volunteer’s dilemma)
combined decisions of 3 partnerscombined decisions of 3 partners
3C/0D 2C/1D 1C/2D 0C/3D 3C/0D 2C/1D 1C/2D 0C/3D
1 1 1 –1
2 2 0 0
1 0.5 0 –1
2 1.5 0.5 0
players
public good
contribution
public good
contribution
n-player prisoner’s dilemma n-player snowdrift
public goods
contribute or defect
equal sharing
surplus
(a)
(b)
Figure 2. Public goods games. (a) Contribution to a public good creates a surplus. In an n-player prisoner’s dilemma game the created value is a linear function of
the amount contributed, while in a n-player snowdrift game it is nonlinear (a step function in the figure). The created value is then shared equally among players
irrespective of initial contributions. (b) Case examples for the payoffs of a focal player depending on whether she contributes or defects and what her three partners
are doing. In the n-player prisoner’s dilemma, it is assumed that contributing costs 1 unit and generates a value of 2 units. In the n-player snowdrift it is assumed
that contributing costs 1 unit and that 2 contributions are needed to produce a public good of 8 units.
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described above, individual actions appear to be self-serving
and to provide public goods only as a by-product (e.g. pun-
ishment of scale-eating sabre-tooth blennies by their victims
[43]; group hunting of multiple non-shared prey [44]). In con-
trast, many terrestrial group hunting examples involve the
killing of a single large prey, where individual payoffs
depend crucially on how the prey is shared rather than on
the increased hunting success [45]. In such cases, payoffs
are affected by ownership, contribution to the hunt, sex
and/or position in the hierarchy (e.g. [46–49]), variables
that are not typically considered in standard public goods
games (but see [50]). Many examples of n-player public
goods have been described in microbes, where the pro-
duction of extracellular molecules constitutes an investment
that can provide benefits to non-producers (reviewed in
[51]). Since increased production typically yields diminishing
benefits, many of these examples yield fitness consequences
that correspond to the volunteer’s dilemma payoff matrix[40]. These various case studies highlight an important
issue: despite the continued focus on n-player prisoner’s
dilemma payoffs in human laboratory studies, many public
goods in humans might also better approximate the non-
linear payoffs of snowdrift/volunteer’s dilemma games
[40,52]. A key priority for future research on humans is there-
fore to evaluate the payoffs of real-world interactions and
design experiments to capture these in the laboratory.(b) Proximate explanations
Research on the cognitive mechanisms underpinning human
helping might initially appear of little value for understanding
helping in other species. This is because humans have a cog-
nitive toolbox that is unmatched by any other species (though
there is considerable debate regarding the extent to which
differences are qualitative or only quantitative [53]). Many
of these cognitive tools are tightly linked to/enhanced by
human language, which is in itself arguably the most
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allow for basic communication about behaviour; it also facili-
tates negotiation, coordination, the expression of some
emotions and the establishment of shared intentionality.
Language is also the basis for some forms of teaching [54]
and the establishment of shared cultural norms. Culture in
turn provides a variety of cues that can be used to generate
cooperation even between strangers. It seems highly likely
that there is a tight link between our cognitive abilities and
our ability to cooperate, though it remains unclear whether
ecological pressures to cooperate selected for our cognitive
abilities or whether these abilities created opportunities for
extreme cooperation. Comparative research that evaluates
what cognitive processes are used by humans and other
species during social interactions might help address this
question.
Claims about uniquely human cognition inspired
research on animal cooperation that challenged these
claims. For example, it has been proposed that humans
achieve high levels of cooperation because they have a
unique sense of fairness (‘inequity aversion’) and thus split
payoffs according to individual contributions [55]. A large
body of research has shown that rudimentary forms of disad-
vantageous inequity aversion—aversion against receiving
less than the interaction partner(s)—may be present in some
non-human species (reviewed in [56]; but see [57]). In con-
trast, evidence for advantageous inequity aversion—
aversion against receiving more than the interaction part-
ner(s)—is currently lacking in non-human species and is
apparently not even ubiquitous in humans [58].
In contrast to cognition, endocrinological research offers
straightforward opportunities for a comparative approach,
as humans are just standard mammals when it comes to hor-
mones, neurohormones or neurotransmitters. Nevertheless,
social scientists have often taken the lead in exploring the
effect of these substances on helping behaviour. Research
on the effects of oxytocin provides a case example. Oxytocin
facilitates bonding between mammalian mothers and their
offspring [59]. Research on humans revealed that this func-
tion may have been co-opted for creating bonds between
unrelated individuals: increased oxytocin increases trust,
without increasing risky behaviour overall, and increases
within-group cooperation and between-group competition
[60]. Oxytocin also mediates helping between unrelated indi-
viduals in several non-human mammals, including
chimpanzees [61], dogs [62], vampire bats [63] and voles
[64]. We note however that the robustness of various find-
ings—in particular those based on exogenous application of
oxytocin—is strongly debated (see [65]), and the jury is still
out on how central-nervous and peripheral oxytocin mediates
social behaviour in humans and other species. These con-
cerns notwithstanding, research on endocrinological
mechanisms underpinning social behaviour has been and
will remain an interdisciplinary project.4. Towards a more ecologically valid approach to
helping in humans and other species
We have repeatedly emphasized how influential research on
human helping was for biological research on other species.
We believe that there is great potential for ever closer
exchange of ideas and methods. Most importantly, biologyhas a long history of thinking about the problem of labora-
tory artefacts. While this does not mean that all biological
research on helping is ecologically relevant [66], we will
now highlight various important concerns about research
on human helping from an ecological perspective. We postu-
late that further progress will depend on empirical data
informing models rather than on experiments fitted to the
assumptions of models.
First, we note that most experimental research taking an
evolutionary approach to understand human cooperation
precludes key features of the human cognitive toolbox, such
as language, shared intentionality and shared group identity.
This is because empiricists typically develop experiments in
accordance with evolutionary game theory, which focuses
on strategies rather than underlying mechanisms [67]. For
instance, as theoretical models do not incorporate communi-
cation, subjects are typically prevented from talking to each
other in experiments. Also, high levels of cooperation in
humans typically occur between friends, colleagues or cultu-
rally created in-groups, while experiments often follow
model assumptions and hence involve anonymous inter-
actions between strangers. Thus, many experimental studies
on humans are designed to test the predictions of general
evolutionary game theory models rather than designed to
explain how humans achieve extremely high levels of
cooperation. As a consequence, we propose that typical econ-
omic experiments only yield baseline levels of human
cooperation and that such levels may also be observed in var-
ious other species [68]. Of course, cooperation could similarly
decrease under different conditions. A recent study [69] found
that human cooperation increased under conditions in which
subjects could talk to each other, in particular when in-group
identity was triggered. We expect that the larger the group
size and/or the incentive to cheat and/or the challenge to
coordinate, the more important the human cognitive toolbox
becomes to achieve high levels of cooperation. Studies that
have allowed for communication during experiments have
shown that communication can increase cooperation, either
via gossip to deter cheating [70] or by allowing subjects to
more efficiently coordinate actions [71]. Varying relationship
quality between subjects will also be likely to yield additional
insights, both in humans and other species.
An important goal for a biological approach to
cooperation is to determine how the findings of abstract lab-
oratory experiments apply in the real world [24,51,65,66].
Economic games that are typically used to study human
behaviour are theory-driven but highly artificial. These
abstract games can allow us to identify with a high degree
of control how the various pillars that structure social inter-
actions (e.g. anonymity, punishment, partner choice)
directionally affect behaviour under the assumption that
ceteris paribus these general effects apply in all settings [72].
Simple abstract games also allow a method for studying
and quantifying variation in helping behaviour within and
across populations (e.g. [73–75]). It is also likely that exclud-
ing more human-specific features like language has
encouraged the interdisciplinary dialogue as both biologists
and social scientists could use similar paradigms. Neverthe-
less, more effort should now be aimed at identifying if
and how the findings from laboratory studies translate into
real-world behaviours. Failing to do so runs the risk that
empirical findings serve only to test the predictions of
game-theoretical models and have little real-world relevance.
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on the meaning of payoff matrices in general, and then on
indirect reciprocity as one specific example.
(a) Payoff matrices
It is unclear to what extent the payoffs used in standard lab-
oratory games approximate the payoffs of interactions that
occur in the real world. The assumption that payoffs correlate
positively with individual fitness holds in populations that
are well mixed both with respect to genetic structure and
with respect to potential interaction partners. The situation
changes when limited migration and overlapping generations
lead to kin structure and the potential for biological altruism,
and when populations are structured into demes (groups)
that compete with each other through contest or scramble
competition. In those cases, material payoffs often provide
a poor correlate of fitness. Instead, interacting individuals
might become interdependent [2,3,76,77]. Interdependence
has been proposed to be key to the evolution of extreme
cooperation in humans [78]. Importantly, letting two highly
interdependent individuals play a one-shot game with a pris-
oner’s dilemma payoff matrix leads to confusion because the
players’ best option with respect to fitness is to either fully
cooperate or to cooperate at least with some probability
[24]. This is because interdependency can alter the fitness
consequences of a prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix in such
a way that fitness can be described by a prisoner’s delight
game (where cooperating yields higher payoffs/fitness via
by-product benefits to the partner) or by a snowdrift game
(where cooperating is under negative frequency dependent
selection; figure 1). For example, zebra finches, a species
with obligate bi-parental care, fail to cooperate with strangers
in an experiment that uses an iterated prisoner’s dilemma
payoff matrix, but they show rather unconditional
cooperation when paired with their social partner [79], per-
haps due to interdependence between social partners [31].
A major question arising from the interdependence hypoth-
esis to explain human uniqueness in levels of cooperation
[78] is hence whether human interdependence is (or was)
much more pronounced than in any other species, or whether
some unique cognitive tools allowed humans to create
extreme mutually beneficial interdependencies between
unrelated individuals.
(b) Indirect reciprocity
Indirect reciprocity also offers a cautionary tale on the impor-
tance of ecological validity. Indirect reciprocity occurs when
an investment to help a recipient yields return benefits by
an investment of a third party rather than by the initial recipi-
ent. Typically, indirect reciprocity therefore involves the
existence of a reputation or an image score, and assessment
rules determine how different actions affect reputation. A
first detailed analysis of stable decision rules was provided
by Kandori [19] and extended by Ohtsuki & Iwasa [80]. How-
ever, there is mixed evidence regarding whether people
actually use these stable rules to judge the actions of others.
Early evidence indicated that these second-order judgement
rules were too cognitively complex to be used [81], while
more recent evidence has indicated that reputation assess-
ments can be predicated on second-order information
regarding the context of helpful [82] or punitive [83] behav-
iour. Perhaps a more fundamental concern with theimportance of indirect reciprocity as a general mechanism
for supporting cooperation is the lack of real-world evidence
that people behave in this way (but see [84]). One key paper
that claims to have demonstrated indirect reciprocity in the
real world [85] instead simply demonstrates that individuals
show concern for reputation, which is not the same thing,
as the crucial component—individuals with good reputation
receive voluntary rewards from others—is missing.
Oneothermajormechanismbywhichconcern for reputation
could yield downstream benefits is via partner choice. There is
ample real-world evidence—including from non-human
species—that partner choice is an important force underpinning
cooperation, and the pressure to be chosen as a partner can lead
to strategic [86] (and even competitive [29,87]) investments in
reputation. Laboratory studies demonstrating indirect recipro-
city may therefore be tapping into psychological mechanisms
aimed at striking up mutually cooperative relationships with
partners that have a good reputation, even though this is not
possible in most laboratory studies of indirect reciprocity.
Under the logic of error management [88], one could further
predict that thehighpayoffs of strikingup just onemutuallypro-
ductive relationship by ‘rewarding’ a helpful individual could
sustain several small investments in rewards that do not ulti-
mately lead to a relationship (cf. [89]). Error-management
strategies could therefore result in behaviours that had the
appearance of ‘rewarding’ helpful individuals in one-shot
encounters, but would actually function to establish productive
relationships. Experiments investigating the adaptive signifi-
cance of acquiring a good reputation under real-world settings
are now crucial to determine the relative importance of indirect
reciprocity and reputation-based partner choice as mechanisms
supporting cooperation.
This discussion highlights a larger issue of experimenter
demand [90] in laboratory studies of human behaviour—
changes in behaviour that occur because of what the subject
believes to be appropriate in that context, rather than due to
intrinsic motives or preferences. Most laboratory studies of
indirect reciprocity have limited the behavioural options avail-
able to players. Thus, although indirect reciprocity is observed
in laboratory experiments, we cannot rule out that these beha-
viours result from the expression of emotions whose only
possible outlet in the context of the experiment is to reward
helpful others. These emotions might well produce alternative
behaviours in real-world scenarios that are nevertheless pre-
vented by the rather impoverished selection available in the
laboratory. Attempts to approximate reality by giving players
more options in empirical games canaffect the expression of be-
haviour (e.g. [36,83]). We suggest that the next wave of human
evolutionary behavioural sciences ought to fully embrace these
complexities in order to understand how behaviour in artificial
laboratory settings relates to that in the real world.5. General conclusion and outlook
We certainly support the idea that studies on human helping
behaviour are relevant for biological research. In the tradition
of Darwin [91], the highest relevance is achieved by studies
that take an explicit evolutionary approach and refer at
least to some extent to empirical and/or theoretical studies
on other species. This view is also reflected in papers pub-
lished recently in Proceedings of the Royal Society B (see
electronic supplementary material).
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studying how individuals decide whether to help, to cheat, to
punish or to switch partners. This issue of decision-making
links function and mechanisms. There is a clear need to
study these processes [92] because humans and other animals
do not use the simple strategies investigated in game-theoretic
models (e.g. [93–95]). To determinewhy not, we should study
social cognition—the mechanisms by which animals acquire,
process, store and act on information from other individuals
[96]—in its broadest biological sense. Perception of relevant
stimuli can fundamentally affect decision-making. For
example, it has been proposed that humans and other animals
use heuristics or rules of thumb [97] to reach decisions quickly
by ignoring a portion of the available information [98]. These
processes are probably routed in well-established universal
learning mechanisms, such as learning based on positive or
negative reinforcement [99]. Excitingly, even in humans,
reinforcement learning may explain various deviations as
well as conformity with payoff-maximising behaviour [100]:
for example, if behavioural option A yields a small gain in
most trials, positive reinforcement may cause subjects to
prefer this option over a more profitable option B that yields
a high reward in few trials.
Recent theoretical studies have started to explicitly model
reinforcement learning over the lifetime of individuals and
selection on specific reinforcement learning parameters (i.e.
the change in the probability of repeating a behaviour after
receiving a reward) to study the consequences on social be-
haviour [101,102]. The models show that selection acting on
reinforcement learning can yield cooperative solutions in an
iterated prisoner’s dilemma as well as consistent co-operators
and defectors within pairs playing a repeated snowdrift
game. What is still missing in the models is an integration
of perceptual aspects. Early ethologists pointed out that
learning needs to be studied within evolutionary history
(i.e. within the ecology of a species). This is because evolution
may shape the perception of species such that certain stimuli
are more likely than others to elicit learning through positive
or negative reinforcement. To give a concrete example, clea-
ner wrasse need to give priority to visitor clients over
resident clients, as the former would otherwise swim off
and visit another cleaner [34]. Species can be identified by
their colour patterns and body shape, while the food (various
species of ectoparasites) is highly overlapping between resi-
dents and visitors. As a consequence, cleaners can readilylearn to preferentially approach an ephemeral food plate
that differs from a permanent food plate only with respect
to colour and patterns, a task that is extremely difficult for
primates as well as rats and pigeons [103–105]. However, if
the food items are coloured differently, or if food is hidden
under cups of different colours, capuchin monkeys readily
learn to prefer the ephemeral food source [106]. Taken
together, the studies show that performance in the same bio-
logical market task varies according to a species’s ability to
perceive the relevant stimulus. Perception, strength of per-
ceived reinforcement on actions and memory capacities
(declarative, episodic or simply emotional) will all contribute
to variation in cooperation within and between species.
In conclusion, we affirm that humans are just another
species to test evolutionary theory. Research on human
cooperation that takes a clear ecological or evolutionary per-
spective is as biologically relevant as research on any other
species. Although helping has long been considered as an
evolutionary puzzle that needs to reconciled with evolution-
ary theory and its emphasis on egoism, we believe that this
puzzle has already been solved in the sense that there are
many concepts that provide conditions under which biologi-
cal altruism and cooperation can be favoured by selection.
What is currently lacking is a general framework that can
explain variation in helping tendencies within and between
species, with human cooperation being the single most idio-
syncratic data point. The current puzzle is thus why human
cooperation is so unique on a quantitative level—and, more-
over, why we also observe such striking variation in
cooperation among different human individuals, groups
and societies. We have argued that to solve the puzzle, we
need to be more explicit about the links between cooperation
and ecology and between cooperation and cognition (see also
[107]). Both issues warrant a comparative approach, making
research on human cooperation an interdisciplinary project
of high biological relevance.
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